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INTRODUCTION
The jury, passing on the prisoner's life,
May in the sworn twelve have a thief or two
Guiltier than him they try.**
More than three hundred years ago, William Shakespeare rec-
ognized that problems occur in the jury box. For almost as long,
courts have been wrestling with the question of what to do when a
problem is brought to light after the jury has returned its verdict.
In 1785, Lord Mansfield wrote the opinion in the now famous case,
Vaise v. Delaval,1 that held that the testimony of a juror is not
admissible to impeach the jury's verdict. The Vaise decision did
not determine the matter, and courts continued to address the is-
sue over the next two centuries, reaching conflicting results.2 Al-
though the enactment of Rule 606(b) 3 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in 1975 provided further guidance, the continuing difficulty
of the problem is demonstrated by the United States Supreme
Court's reconsideration of the issue in 1987, two years after the
bicentennial of the Vaise decision, in Tanner v. United States.'
The five to four decision in Tanner, however, did not resolve the
problem, it only engendered heightened debate.5
Why, after more than two centuries of study and consideration
by the courts and legal scholars alike, does the debate over the
impeachment of jury verdicts persist? The problem is not one sus-
ceptible to an easy solution. If we lived in a perfect world, fair and
impartial juries would be selected; they would listen to the evi-
dence, retire to the jury room, discuss the evidence rationally in a
cordial manner, follow the court's instructions, reach a just and
logical verdict, accurately report that verdict and be excused. Un-
** W. SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, at II.i. 19.
99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
See, e.g., McDonald and United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264
(1915).
3 FED. R. EvID. 606(b); see infra note 111 (text of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)).
4 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
' See Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 218-33 (1989); Crump, Jury Mis-
conduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary
Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C.L. REv. 509, 520-25 (1988); Comment, Tanner v.
United States: Does Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) Foreclose Postverdict Inquiry Into Juror Intoxica-
tion?, 10 CriM. JUST. J. 347, 350 (1988); Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh
Review and Evaluation, 1987 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SECTION, reprinted in 120 F.R.D. 299, 353-
54 (1987).
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fortunately, a myriad of problems can develop during this process,
for example, a juror's untruthful response to a voir dire question
may result in his improper placement on the jury. Jurors may base
a verdict on rumors, newspaper accounts, or comments by court
personnel. Inadmissible evidence or bias against a party may influ-
ence a jury verdict. Litigants, third parties, or even other jurors
may threaten or pressure jury members to reach a certain verdict.
The jury may misunderstand the court's instructions or the ramifi-
cations of its verdict. Furthermore, a jury verdict may be founded
on a compromise, quotient, or even a coin toss.
Although the above examples are disturbing, many problems
may usually be obviated if they are detected prior to the verdict.
In most cases, courts can excuse a juror, give cautionary instruc-
tions to the jury, or take other action to eliminate these problems
and thereby permit the jury to proceed with its deliberations and
return an untainted verdict.' However, if the problem is first de-
tected after the verdict is rendered, the damage is not easily un-
done. At that point the case is over; the jury has been excused, and
to the parties and all the world the verdict is final. Moreover, any
inquiry into the verdict may require interviewing jurors and com-
pelling them to testify about their secret deliberations. Such an in-
vasion of the jury room is considered antithetical to the traditions
of our jury system. Undoubtedly, these inquiries present certain
risks and dangers.
Conceptually, it is important to view the law governing im-
peachment of jury verdicts not as an evidentiary rule, but as a
body of law comprised of many elements, each affecting the other.
While it is true that Rule 606(b)7 does deal with the issue directly,
other principles, such as procedural rules preventing the initiation
of a postverdict inquiry, limitations on the grounds for impeach-
ment, court rules restricting contact with jurors, and the finding of
harmless error, can, individually or collectively, have a more signif-
icant impact on the outcome of a particular case. This body of law,
viewed as a whole, is driven by a number of policy considerations.
The issue of impeachment of jury verdicts involves a tension be-
0 See Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 419, 541 A.2d 1001, 1005-06 (1988); Chandler v.
U-Line Corp., 91 N.C. App. 315, 324-25, 371 S.E.2d 717, 722-23 (1988); Kornstein, Impeach-
ment of Partial Verdicts, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 663, 675-76 (1980); Mueller, Jurors' Im-
peachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L.
REv. 920, 959-60 (1978).
FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see infra note 111 (text of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)).
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tween two competing interests. On the one hand, a case must be
decided solely on the evidence presented before a fair and impar-
tial jury. On the other hand, there is a well-recognized need for
confidentiality of jury deliberations and finality of verdicts. The
merits of the first interest are obvious. A party, particularly a
criminal defendant, is entitled to a verdict based solely on evidence
presented to a fair and impartial jury.8 Therefore, if it later ap-
pears that the jury was improperly influenced or considered mat-
ters outside the evidence in its deliberations, the verdict should be
set aside. Such policy concerns have led many authorities to advo-
cate the need for more liberal rules governing impeachment of jury
verdicts.9
Congress and the courts have disregarded these calls. Instead,
in deference to the need for preserving the confidentiality of jury
deliberations and the finality of the verdict, they have increasingly
restricted the impeachment of jury verdicts. This may, in part, be
attributable to the view that the jury system can serve as a protec-
tor of our liberty only if the secrecy of deliberations is maintained.
It may also reflect a concern that impeachment of jury verdicts
presents a temptation to engage in one of the greatest hazards to
the jury system-threats and intimidation of jurors. Furthermore,
because an intimidated juror seldom will reveal the incident of in-
timidation, there is little chance that the corruption will be re-
vealed. It may be that Congress and the Judiciary simply do not
believe most of the allegations made in connection with attacks on
jury verdicts. Whatever the reason, however, their pursuit of a
more restrictive approach is undeniable.10 It is interesting to note
that the first consideration-ensuring a verdict rendered by a fair
and impartial jury-appears to place greater weight on the reliabil-
ity of the result in a particular case, while the second con-
cern-verdict finality and confidentiality of jury delibera-
tions-places greater emphasis on the integrity of the jury system
as a whole. This distinction may well play a critical role in resolv-
ing the issues.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 52-60.
' See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 5, at 221-33 (advocating stricter review of juror con-
duct); Crump, supra note 5, at 511-13 (advocating narrow targeted view as most advanta-
geous); Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process-Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J. 1187, 1202-29 (1984-985)
(recognizing conflict between Rule 606(b) and sixth amendment).
10 See infra notes 139-238 and accompanying text.
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This Article will commence with an examination of the rea-
sons that courts have rejected the repeated calls for revision of
Rule 606(b) and the adoption of more liberal rules governing im-
peachment of jury verdicts. Next, it will review alternative rules
and approaches which have been overlooked by many commenta-
tors. Finally, this Article will attempt to determine the impact of
these concepts on future developments in this area of the law.
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RESTRICTIONS ON
IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS
The law governing impeachment of jury verdicts is founded on
certain policy considerations. As noted earlier, a tension exists be-
tween the need for confidentiality of deliberation and verdict final-
ity, and the requirement that the case be decided solely on the
evidence presented to a fair and impartial jury. Each of these com-
peting concerns implicates a complex matrix of sub-issues requir-
ing difficult value judgments. These judgments must be guided by
public policy considerations, such as the sanctity of jury delibera-
tions, finality in jury determinations, and the necessity of a fair
trial.
A. The Sanctity of Jury Deliberations
Perhaps the most important of these policy considerations is
the sanctity of jury deliberations. The United States Supreme
Court has expressed concern as to whether the jury system could,
in fact, survive if the deliberation process were exposed to public
scrutiny after the verdict was rendered." This concern is based
upon several different factors; and while many of these factors are
interrelated, for the purpose of this discussion, it will be helpful to
examine each of them separately.
1. Exposure of Jurors to Postverdict Pressure
The courts have long believed that permitting postverdict in-
quiries of jury deliberations would provide a means for dissatisfied
litigants to pursue, harass, or even threaten jurors in an effort to
upset the verdict. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
the oft-cited McDonald v. Pless:'2
See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
z 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
[Vol. 65:389
IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS
[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and pub-
licly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the tes-
timony of those who took part in their publication and all ver-
dicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the
hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding.
Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an
effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish
misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus se-
cured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was
intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of pub-
lic investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and freedom
of discussion and conference.13
In order to discourage litigants from engaging in such activi-
ties, the courts have created a disincentive, which may be de-
scribed as an exclusionary rule, 4 similar in principle and substance
to the exclusionary rule found in the area of criminal procedure.
The rule is based on the premise that litigants can be dissuaded
from engaging in unlawful or improper activity by rendering evi-
dence gained from that activity inadmissible. For example, in the
area of criminal procedure this is accomplished by ruling that the
fruits of unlawful conduct, such as an illegal search, are inadmissi-
ble in evidence.15 In cases involving impeachment of jury verdicts,
courts have established an analogous rule of evidence. With some
exceptions, this rule provides that evidence gleaned from posttrial
interviews is inadmissible. 16 It most often takes the form of a rule
3 Id. at 267-68; see Tanner, 438 U.S. at 120-21 (jury privacy essential to public confi-
dence in verdict); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1077-79 (3d
Cir. 1985) (discussing policies underlying impeachment); Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148-50 (3d Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976);
Crump, supra note 5, at 533-35 (prevention of juror harassment and postverdict persuasion
cited as primary policy considerations); Kornstein, supra note 6, at 669-71 (discussing rea-
sons behind impeachment); Mueller, supra note 6, at 922-24 (same); Note, Impeachment of
Verdicts by Jurors-Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 417, 440-41 (1978)
(same); Comment, To Impeach or Not to Impeach: The Stability of Juror Verdicts in Fed-
eral Courts, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 343, 344-46 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Stability of
Jury Verdicts] (same); Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 360,
364-65 (1958) [hereinafter Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts] (same); Comment,
Juror Privilege: The Answer to the Impeachment Puzzle?, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 447, 453-
54 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Juror Privilege] (recognizing imperfections in jury per-
formance). But see Alschuler, supra note 5, at 226-27 (arguing policy considerations do not
justify impeachment rule); Thompson, supra note 9, at 1224-25 (same).
,4 See Mueller, supra note 6, at 922-27.
16 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
398 (1914).
,1 See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 365. "The general
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rendering jurors incompetent to testify.
The courts and commentators have repeatedly recognized the
importance of protecting jurors from posttrial threats and harass-
ment.17 Because jurors provide a vital public service in exchange
for little or no compensation, it is essential that they be protected.
Unlike judges, attorneys, police officers, and others familiar with
the court, most jurors are largely unacquainted with the judicial
process and may derive their views on the system from motion pic-
tures, television shows, and the media. Therefore, they may be
more susceptible to subtle and not so subtle pressure, at least in
the eyes of a losing party. These concerns are especially legitimate
in a small community where the juror may have fears about re-
turning to the neighborhood, particularly after rendering what is
viewed as an "unpopular verdict."18
It must also be recognized that virtually all litigants, especially
criminal defendants, hold some hope of success, and many, if not
most, are confident that they will prevail. Only after the verdict is
announced does the reality of defeat set in. At that point, the pos-
sibly desperate litigant has very few alternatives remaining. To the
unscrupulous, securing verdict impeachment evidence from a juror
is perhaps the most promising and effective method of upsetting
the verdict. Moreover, such a person may resort to threats and in-
timidation in an attempt to obtain such evidence. 9 The pernicious
nature of such contact is compounded by the fact that the threats
may be made anonymously, and, due to fear for personal safety or
practice of defeating most attempts at impeachment by exclusion of jurors' testimony might
be justified as a way of discouraging these attempts." Id. For an excellent analysis of this
rule and a critique of the broad scope of Rule 606(b), see Crump, supra note 5, at 535-41.
17 See supra note 13.
"8 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1079 (3d Cir. 1985).
Recognizing this problem the Nicholas court stated:
Gereau also reveals the risk of post-verdict inquiries. In Gereau the trial
judge found that two jurors had given affidavits impeaching their prior verdict
because of certain peer "pressures . .. to change [their] verdict" and that "the
affidavits were involuntarily made out of fear." He found that one of the jurors
who had given an affidavit "also had fears about returning to the community and
particularly to his friends in Fredericksted."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,
146 (3d Cir. 1975)); see also Note, Public Disclosure of Jury Deliberations, 96 HAtv. L. REV.
886, 894 (1983) (arguing public disclosure negatively affects deliberations).
19 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117 (1987). "As it stands then, the rule [FED. R. Evm. 606]
would permit the harassment of former jurors by losing parties as well as the possible ex-
ploitation of disgruntled or otherwise badly-motivated ex-jurors." Id. at 124 (citations omit-
ted) (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974)).
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the safety of family members, the juror may fail to reveal the coer-
cion to the authorities. In such situations, the perpetrator is virtu-
ally assured that the impropriety will never be discovered by the
court.
Finally, if parties are permitted to interview jurors and use the
information gained therefrom, there is a real possibility that both
parties will feel compelled to pursue and harass jurors. The losing
party will attempt to secure information that will overturn the ver-
dict, and the prevailing party, as a precaution, will seek to secure
affidavits supporting the verdict to protect it from attack. In many
cases, this may lead to conflicting juror affidavits20 and encourage a
race to the jurors on the premise that the first party to interview a
juror has a better chance of obtaining a favorable response. 21 For
all of these reasons, the courts have protected jurors from im-
proper postverdict pressure.
2. Suspicion of Postverdict Allegations
Generally, courts view postverdict allegations of juror miscon-
duct with suspicion. Although this skepticism is rarely mentioned
explicitly in judicial opinions, it is frequently revealed more subtly.
Often, courts have noted that although the situation allegedly ex-
isted prior to the verdict, the juror made no mention of it before
the verdict was returned.22 Similarly, opinions note that rather
than make a timely report, a juror waited months or even years
before mentioning the problem.23 In cases involving juror compe-
tency, courts have placed importance on the fact that neither the
trial court, counsel, court personnel, nor other jurors detected the
alleged problem.24 Implicit, if not explicit, in all of these observa-
tions is the conclusion that the court simply did not believe the
20 See Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1075-77 (discussing issues resulting from production of
conflicting affidavits).
21 In such cases, not only is the juror harassed by both parties, but he becomes the
determinant figure, thereby increasing the incentive for coercion, threats, or even bribery.
See Shamburger v. Behrens, 418 N.W.2d 299, 304 (S.D. 1988).
22 See Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1080-81; United States v. Pellegrini, 441 F. Supp. 1367,
1371 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af/'d, 586 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1050 (1978).
22 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120 (noting that in Nicholas, juror's allegation of impropri-
ety was first made one year and eight months after the verdict was returned); see also
United States v. Piccarreto, 718 F. Supp. 1088, 1091-92 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (complaint lodged
two months after verdict).
24 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125-27; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759
F.2d 1073, 1075-77; Piccarreto, 718 F. Supp. at 1094.
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representations made by the juror.
Misgivings may also be based on concerns that are present in
all cases. As a general rule, courts are inclined to reject any
postverdict change in position. For example, in witness recantation
cases, courts have consistently ignored witnesses' claims that they
testified falsely and therefore wish to change their testimony.2 5
Many of the concerns underlying the decisions in the witness re-
cantation cases are also present in cases involving impeachment of
a jury verdict. In fact, many verdict impeachment cases can be
aptly described as "juror recantation" cases.
If a juror is compromised by threats or coercion, questions
arise as to the veracity of anything that the juror says. Obviously
then, statements or affidavits made by the juror with regard to ju-
ror misconduct are also called into question. Perhaps even more
importantly, compromised jurors are likely to make false represen-
tations as to the spontaneity of their revelations or their motiva-
tions in coming forward. A juror who is induced by threats to make
statements impeaching a verdict certainly will not admit that he
was coerced. On the contrary, for self-protection and the protec-
tion of loved ones, the juror will claim that he came forward to
correct an injustice. Thus, in most cases, it will never be known
whether the juror's representations of misconduct were induced by
threats or by a sincere desire to correct a mistake. 2 For this rea-
son, the court may be suspect, not only of the substance of
postverdict allegations made by jurors, but also of the representa-
tions made by the jurors concerning their motivations in coming
forward.
There are other situations that can lead a juror to make incor-
rect statements tending to impeach the jury's verdict. It may be
very uncomfortable for jurors to deal with interviews initiated by
dissatisfied litigants, and jurors may make inaccurate statements
to avoid a confrontation, to disassociate themselves from what is
perceived to be an unpopular verdict, or simply to escape from the
party's presence. A false statement may also be precipitated by
bad feelings developed in the heat of jury deliberations, the notion
that one's views were not respected, or even hostility towards other
25 See United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 177-79 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Kearney, 682 F.2d 214, 219-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 960
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977).
20 See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975).
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jurors.17 Furthermore, a juror may agree with a verdict at the time
of the vote, but later have second thoughts about the decision, es-
pecially after being subjected to comments, criticisms, and pres-
sures of family, friends, and the community at large. 8 While none
of these circumstances should constitute grounds for upsetting a
jury verdict, they could lead a juror to make incorrect statements
at odds with the jury's decision.
Finally, the courts have recognized that the possibility of out-
right fraud by a juror exists. For example, a juror may attempt to
extort money from the prevailing party under a threat that he will
expose information that could be used to impeach the verdict.2 9
Prevention of such fraud is one of the central purposes of the rules
limiting postverdict juror testimony.3 0
3. The Chilling Effect on the Deliberative Process
The United States Supreme Court, in McDonald v. Pless,31
noted its concern that public investigations into jury verdicts could
lead to "the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion
and conference. 3 2 Under our system, jurors weigh the evidence
and arguments of counsel, hear the instructions given by the court,
and then retire to the jury room to deliberate. From the often dis-
parate views of all of the jurors, they attempt to forge a single fair
and just verdict. A group can deliberate effectively only if its mem-
bers feel free to express their views candidly, without fear of em-
barrassment or reprisal. Only in an atmosphere permitting the free
exchange of ideas can specious arguments and prejudice be un-
27 See Piccarreto, 718 F. Supp. at 1092; Mueller, supra note 6, at 924.
28 See Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1079; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523
F.2d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
29 See Shamburger v. Behrens, 418 N.W.2d 299, 301 (S.D. 1988).
10 Id. at 304 (quoting United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977)).
21 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
" Id. at 268; see also Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21 (postverdict scrutiny undermines pub-
lic trust); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (7th Cir. 1987) (privacy essential to
robust deliberations); United States v. Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1973) (privacy
and frankness needed in jury room); Kornstein, supra note 6, at 669-71 (three goals: secrecy,
protection, finality); Note, supra note 18, at 889-92 (need to shield jurors); Note, supra note
13 (prevent inhibition and harassment of jurors); Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13,
at 452-54 (protection of jurors critical). But see Alschuler, supra note 5, at 226 (petit jurors
under obligation to preserve confidentiality of deliberations); Thompson, supra note 9, at
1196-97, 1222-24 (questioning whether secrecy is essential to operation of American jury).
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veiled, and well-reasoned arguments prevail.3 Such an atmosphere
requires that jury deliberations be secret, and that this confidenti-
ality be maintained.34
If there is a possibility that the jury's deliberations will be ex-
posed to public scrutiny, jurors will be less willing to express their
views candidly and freely.3 5 Jurors may be concerned with reprisals
from members of the community who learn of their comments or
advocacy of an unfavored position. 6 There is a danger that merito-
rious, but unpopular, views will be repressed, that the timid will
not speak, and that the parties will not have the benefit of open
deliberations. Even worse, jurors may feel pressured to render pop-
ular, rather than fair, verdicts.3 7 Finally, members of the commu-
nity may be reluctant to serve as jurors if there exists a possibility
that their comments will be made public, that they will be
harassed after the verdict, and that they will be called to testify on
matters pertaining to their jury service and deliberations. 8 Only
the secrecy of the deliberative process will ensure that the individ-
ual juror is protected in his or her effort to deliberate in a coura-
geous, free, and candid manner.3 " For these reasons, courts have
been concerned about the chilling effect that verdict impeachment
may have on the deliberative process.
4. The Effect of a Hearing
Perhaps the most important issue to be decided in a case
where a party is seeking to impeach a verdict is whether or not the
court should hold a hearing. The benefits of a hearing are obvious.
Usually, it is the best method of determining the merit of the argu-
3 See supra note 13. It is interesting to note that by prohibiting inquiry into the
thought processes of jurors, the courts also have precluded inquiry into the thought
processes of judges. Cf. Morrison v. Kimmelman, 650 F. Supp. 801, 805-07 (D.N.J. 1986)
(trial judge, sitting as trier of fact, cannot be called to testify in habeas corpus proceeding).
1, At least one commentator holds the view that protecting the secrecy of the jury room
has constitutional implications. See Note, supra note 18.
35 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972, 978-79 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977).
3' See supra note 18.
"' See Note, supra note 18, at 889-92.
38 Id. at 889.
39 Id. at 889-92. In Tanner, the Supreme Court stated: "There is little doubt that post-
verdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation
of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper jury behavior. It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it." 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987).
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ment for attacking the verdict. The party seeking to impeach the
verdict often will request that the court hold a hearing to deter-
mine whether the allegations are well-founded. 0 Such requests,
however, are often denied.41 The courts' positions are based on the
concern that, the very holding of a hearing will give rise to risks
and problems, especially if jurors are called to testify.
The problems discussed above, relating to the chilling effect
that postverdict inquiries have on the deliberative process, will be-
come particularly acute if jurors perceive that their activities may
come under scrutiny at a public hearing or, even worse, that they
may be called to testify and be cross-examined concerning their
deliberations. 2 Also, the mere possibility that a hearing will be
held may defeat the purpose behind the exclusionary rule.43 Con-
cerns that jurors will be exposed to threats, harassment, and pres-
sure led to the adoption of the exclusionary rule. However, the use
of information gained from postverdict juror contacts to secure a
hearing that might lead to the impeachment of the verdict may
render the exclusionary rule wholly ineffective. The exclusionary
rule can only maintain its potency if information gained from
postverdict contact with jurors is not used for any purpose, includ-
ing the procurement of a hearing.
Finally, there exists a question as to whether the suspicions
harbored by the courts concerning juror recantations would be con-
firmed or dispelled by evidence adduced at a hearing.44 Certainly,
it may be argued that jurors' allegations could be proved or dis-
proved at the hearing, particularly if other evidence is available.
However, it is quite possible that a juror who has been compro-
mised will persist in the position induced by threats or coercion,
concealing the fact that he has been threatened or pressured, and
the court will thus remain unaware of the impropriety, even after a
hearing.43 There are, therefore, strong public policy reasons against
holding a hearing.
40 See Andrews v. Schulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 922 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Tanner,
483 U.S. at 134-35 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985) (Garth, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
41 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126-27; Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1081; United States v. Di-
oguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
42 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
43 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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B. The Need for Finality
When discussing postverdict inquiries, courts and scholars rec-
ognize that the need for finality of the verdict is an important pol-
icy consideration."' Confidence in the finality of verdicts is impor-
tant both to the parties and to society as a whole. Public
confidence in the judicial system is critical.
This consideration carries with it the notion that, at some
point, litigation must end, and that the community must be able to
rely on court decisions as final. Destructive uncertainty may de-
velop if courts are viewed as indecisive, and verdicts can be at-
tacked months or even years after the litigation has ended. 47 How-
ever, the concept of finality implicates additional, and perhaps
even more significant, policy considerations.
The requirement of finality is intimately related to the ulti-
mate objective of our system of justice-insuring that the judg-
ments of our courts are equitable and just. If a verdict is im-
peached and the judgment set aside, it may be years before the
case is retried. This is particularly true when the matter has been
on appeal or where a juror has waited months or years before re-
vealing the problem. It is well-recognized that, unlike fine wine,
steaks, and cheese, lawsuits do not improve with age. As time
passes, memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence
is often lost. In most cases, parties have great difficulty marshaling
their evidence for another trial. The final result may have more to
do with the good fortune of a party in obtaining evidence for the
second trial than the actual merits of the case.48 Due to these
problems, it is uncertain whether a later retrial is likely to result in
41 See, e.g., Tanner, 483 U.S. 107, 124-25 (1987) (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-14 (1974)) (finality essential for jury system to fuction); Government of the Vir-
gin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1078 (3d Cir. 1985) (same); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975) (listing several public policies behind
non-impeachment rule), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); Shamburger v. Behrens, 418
N.W.2d 299, 304 (S.D. 1988) (discussing impact of covert action finality); Crump, supra note
5, at 534 (discussing finality as necessary factor); Kornstein, supra note 6, at 669-70 n.46
(finality necessary to proper functioning of system); Mueller, supra note 6, at 924 (discus-
sion of public policy considerations); Note, supra note 18, at 897 (same); Note, supra note
13, at 441-42 (same); Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 454 (same). But see Al-
schuler, supra note 5, at 225-26 (need for finality of verdict does not justify rejection of
probative evidence that judicial process did not function properly); Thompson, supra note
9, at 1225 (criticizing limitation of juror testimony about deliberation and verdict in interest
of finality because close inquiry presumed to reveal impropriety).
4 See Note, supra note 13, at 441-42.
48 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).
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a just verdict.
Another matter related to finality is the effect of impeachment
of a jury verdict in criminal cases. A jury verdict of "not guilty" is
final and may never be impeached under the fifth amendment
principles of double jeopardy." Thus, the benefit of impeaching a
jury verdict in a criminal case can inure only to the defendant.
This disparity in treatment may tend, at least to a limited extent,
to weigh in favor of verdict finality for all parties.
The need for finality is closely related to other policy consider-
ations. If the verdict is viewed as final, losing parties will have lit-
tle incentive to threaten or harass jurors in order to elicit evidence
that will upset the verdict.5 0 The corresponding reduction in the
risk of such improprieties will create an- atmosphere conducive to
the finding of a fair and equitable verdict. 1
C. The Interests of Insuring a Fair Trial
The policies outlined above are important, persuasive, and di-
rectly related to the interest of insuring that the parties receive a
fair trial. Why then should we permit impeachment of jury ver-
dicts at all? Would it not be in the interest of justice to establish a
rule prohibiting the impeachment of any jury verdict? Virtually all
scholars and courts respond with a resounding "no." This response
is based on strong policy considerations of constitutional dimen-
sion.
1. Generally
While the considerations discussed above may be important in
ensuring that the parties receive a fair trial, the same interest may
militate even more strongly in favor of impeachment of a jury ver-
dict under certain circumstances. Under our system of justice the
litigants are entitled to a fair and impartial verdict based solely on
the evidence adduced at trial.5 2 Therefore, if a verdict is the result
of threats against jurors, outside or erroneous information pro-
vided to jurors, or other improper influences, the parties have not
11 See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).
50 See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
8 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
52 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); Jordan v.
Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); see also Alschuler, supra note 5, at 229 (framers
may have meant "trial by an impartial, awake, and unstoned jury").
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received the just and impartial verdict to which they are entitled.
Few would argue that the losing party should be denied a new trial
if it can be unequivocally demonstrated that the verdict resulted
solely from threats made against the jurors by the prevailing
party. 3 The question then becomes not whether the impeachment
of the verdict should be permitted, but rather, under what circum-
stances is impeachment of the verdict appropriate. This leads to
the consideration of several constitutional issues.
2. Constitutional Requirements
Proponents of rules permitting more liberal impeachment of
jury verdicts consistently have invoked the provisions of the fed-
eral Constitution, more specifically, the Bill of Rights, in support
of their position. The due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments will be implicated in any consideration of this
issue. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, the United States Su-
preme Court "has long recognized that '[d]ue process implies a tri-
bunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hear-
ing,' . . . 'a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on
the evidence before it.' ,,54 It has also been held that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to a competent and unimpaired jury, and this right has
been extended to the states through the provisions of the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. 5 The sixth amendment
right to confrontation is also implicated on the theory that the
right is violated when the jury receives information from a source
that is not subject to cross-examination.56 Thus, a litigant seeking
to impeach a jury verdict can in almost all cases present an argu-
11 However, as previously noted this does not apply if the prevailing party is a criminal
defendant. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
" Tanner, 483 U.S. at 134 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (cita-
tions omitted); see Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (1st Cir.) (due process requires
fair trial), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); Thompson, supra note 9, at 1193-95, 1226-29
(suggesting broader focus on right to jury trial); Note, supra note 13, at 421-24 (due process
argument available where impeachment impermissible).
11 See Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1071 (1989); Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 419-20, 541 A.2d 1001, 1005-06 (1988). The
impeachment of jury verdicts could also implicate the seventh amendment. See Note, supra
note 18.
58 See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966); United States ex rel. Owen v. Mc-
Mann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Note, supra note
13, at 421-22; Comment, The Stability of Juror Verdicts, supra note 13, at 346.
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ment that has constitutional dimensions. 57 While the right to a fair
and impartial jury and the right to cross examine witnesses are not
without limitation,58 they are of great importance.
Of equal importance is the fact that parties can protect their
constitutional rights only if they are permitted to take steps to de-
termine whether any basis for jury impeachment exists. This is
usually accomplished by conducting postverdict interviews of ju-
rors. However, the courts have consistently upheld rules and orders
restricting communication between parties and jurors.5 9 Thus, the
courts have, in effect, erected an obstacle to the protection of con-
stitutional rights.
An argument based on the fifth, sixth, or fourteenth amend-
ment could, however, prove to be a double-edged sword. For exam-
ple a constitutional argument is also available to prevailing parties
seeking to avoid the impeachment of the jury verdict. Such parties
can maintain that the constitutional rights of all citizens to a fair
and impartial jury require that jurors be free from postverdict in-
quiries. This argument is based on the policy concerns discussed
above, namely, that postverdict inquiries invite jury tampering and
chill jury deliberations."0
Although constitutional arguments may be available to both
the prevailing and the losing parties, they are most frequently and
most effectively advanced by the party seeking to impeach a ver-
dict, and they are particularly cogent when asserted on behalf of a
criminal defendant. Nonetheless, not even constitutional argu-
ments advanced on behalf of criminal defendants are always suc-
cessful. Their success depends on the application of the various ap-
5' This is particularly important to prisoners seeking postconviction relief under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255, since it can serve as the constitutional predicate for a habeas corpus
petition. See Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1199-2000 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
832 (1988); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 1987).
51 See infra notes 233-38.
60 See infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text. As one commentator expressed,
[T]he constitutional arguments cut both ways. Whenever impeachment requires
jurors' testimony, the verdict could be supported by an argument that Lord Mans-
field's rule, laid down in 1785, is a basic feature of the system, constituting a ma-
jor block to judicial supervision of deliberations, and that it therefore was incorpo-
rated in constitutional provisions preserving the jury trial.
Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 369 (footnotes omitted); see
also Note, supra note 18 ("[p]osttrial scrutiny sabotages sixth and seventh amendment val-
ues to the extent that,... the public's very possession of information about . . . [jurors']
deliberations may become tantamount to control over them").
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proaches taken by the courts to the facts of a particular case.
Therefore, it will be helpful to review the elements of the law gov-
erning the impeachment of jury verdicts.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT OF JURY
VERDICTS
The law governing the impeachment of jury verdicts is, in fact,
one body of law consisting of a number of elements or approaches.
These elements or approaches are interrelated, and each has an
effect upon the other. This body of law is guided by the policy
considerations previously discussed. For this reason, it is mislead-
ing to label one element, such as Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, as dispositive. The federal rule is but a single element
in this body of law, and in many cases, may not be the most impor-
tant. Moreover, focusing on only one element could lead one to
overlook the effect that each of these approaches has upon the
others. It may even be somewhat deceptive to consider these ap-
proaches in isolation. However, for purposes of this discussion and
for the sake of clarity, each element will be examined separately.
A. Declaring the Juror to Be Incompetent to Testify
One approach taken in the law on impeachment of jury ver-
dicts is to declare that a juror is incompetent to testify to impeach
the jury's verdict.5 1 This is a' rule of witness competency and,
therefore, a rule of evidence. When a party attempts to introduce
or otherwise utilize evidence derived from a juror to impeach a ver-
dict, the evidence is subject to objection on the ground that the
witness is incompetent to testify or otherwise present evidence. 2
This approach was taken in 1785 by Lord Mansfield in the
Vaise case, 3 and, if for no other reason than historical precedent,
it has been followed to some extent in most jurisdictions. 4 The
rule incorporates the theory of the exclusionary rule, which is pre-
mised on the assumption that if no use may be made of evidence
61 See Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 450-56.
62 See Kornstein, supra note 6, at 672-74.
e' 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
See Kornstein, supra note 6, at 670-71; Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at
450-57; see also Mueller, supra note 6, at 924-27 (explaining Vaise doctrine and its excep-
tions); Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 360-61 (same). Several
scholars and judges have been critical of Lord Mansfield's decision. See, e.g., Kornstein,
supra note 6, at 671 (views of Lord Mansfield's "hoary shibboleth").
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gained by disfavored conduct, there will be an adequate disincen-
tive to dissuade individuals from engaging in that conduct. In ac-
cordance with this principle Lord Mansfield announced the sweep-
ing precept that a juror's testimony may not be admitted to
impeach a verdict."5
In time it became apparent that the rule in Vaise was too
broad and that, in order to protect the parties' rights to trial by a
fair and impartial jury, some exceptions would be necessary. One
approach was to rule that jurors were competent to testify as to
matters concerning "external influences" that were brought to bear
upon the jury's decision. 6 Under this exception, jurors were per-
mitted to testify about threats made against jurors and informa-
tion not in evidence that found its way into the jury room. Another
approach, the so-called "Iowa rule," excludes all juror testimony as
to matters that "essentially inhere in the verdict itself," but admits-
evidence of an "independent fact. '6 7 While these approaches have
proved helpful in ameliorating injustices resulting from broad ap-
plication of the Vaise rule, they have created new problems, par-
ticularly in defining the terms "external influence," "essentially in-
here in the verdict itself," and "independent fact."68
The competency approach is embodied in Rule 606(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence which provides that, with specified ex-
ceptions, jurors may not testify as to certain matters concerning
jury service. 69 Under Rule 606(b), if the proffered evidence falls
within the rule, the juror is incompetent to testify to impeach a
jury verdict or indictment.
B. Utilization of Procedural Rules
A second approach involves the use of rules of procedure to
65 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
6' See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892); United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817-20 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); see also Kornstein, supra note 6, at 672 (exter-
nal influences appropriate ground for impeachment); Mueller, supra note 6, at 926-27 (ex-
plaining different types of extraneous material); Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts,
supra note 13, at 361-62 (two types of extraneous influence exceptions).
67 See Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); see also Comment, Im-
peachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 362-64 (same); Mueller, supra note 6, at 925-
26 (same); Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 454-55 (discussing Wright case).
es See, e.g., Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117-19 (defining external influence); Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917
(1976).
1" See infra note 111 (text of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)).
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ensure that the claim of the attacking party has merit. Although
the tests established by these procedural rules vary, they all have
the common objective of permitting postverdict inquiries only
where such an inquiry is warranted.
These rules and their respective tests take many forms. Some
permit a court to initiate a postverdict inquiry only upon a thresh-
old showing of irregularity by the attacking party,70 and some
place the burden of proof on that party.71 Others leave the decision
of whether to proceed with a postverdict inquiry to the sound dis-
cretion of the court,72 thereby permitting reversal of that decision
only upon a finding of abuse of discretion.73 Finally, the harmless
error rule has been used to sustain the verdict where there has
been an irregularity. 4 While each of these rules is different in form
and substance, all have the effect of increasing the level of proof
required to overturn a jury verdict, thus making it more difficult to
do so.
It should also be noted that these rules are not mutually ex-
clusive; there is nothing to prevent the application of several or
even all of these rules to the same case.7 5 Since these rules, in ef-
fect, require that the party seeking to impeach the verdict demon-
strate the merits of its claim, they are primarily directed at policy
concerns regarding the credibility of witnesses and other evidence.
These rules do little to dissuade parties from threatening or
harassing jurors after the verdict, and may in fact have the oppo-
site effect of inducing parties to contact jurors in order to obtain
the additional evidence necessary to support their claims. How-
ever, these concerns will, at least to some extent, be addressed by
the evidentiary rule on competency discussed above.
70 See Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1203, 1205 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832
(1988); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985);
King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 850 (1978); United
States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). In Tanner,
483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987), the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that Rule 606(b)
may have retained a common-law exception allowing postverdict inquiry of juror incompe-
tence when an extremely strong showing of incompetence has been made. See id.
71 Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1077; Shamburger v. Behrens, 418 N.W.2d 299, 302 (S.D. 1988).
712 Neron, 841 F.2d at 1203; Shamburger, 418 N.W.2d at 303.
11 See Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Del. 1988).
7' United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1069 (1989); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. Urseth v.
Dayton, 680 F. Supp. 1084, 1094 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (mere finding that verdict was unsup-
ported by evidence insufficient).
781 See Massey, 541 A.2d at 1257-59.
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C. Excluding Contact with Jurors
Courts may, by court rule or order, limit postverdict contact
with jurors.76 These rules and orders differ widely in scope and ef-
fect; they may apply to all cases or only to a particular case, and
may be directed to the jurors, to the litigants, or to third-parties. 77
While the rules and orders are primarily calculated to minimize
the problem of juror harassment, they can have a much broader
effect.
Preventing parties from having contact with jurors will also
prevent litigants from learning of incidents or situations that
would constitute valid grounds for impeaching a verdict. Taken to
the extreme, if the court precluded juror contact with everyone,
the jury deliberations would remain hidden and verdicts would
never be impeached. Such a result could raise serious constitu-
tional issues, particularly if the rule or order were applied to mem-
bers of the press.78
Enforcement of these rules and orders also presents an inter-
esting issue. Violations would probably expose the individual to
sanctions for contempt, but the courts are also at liberty to disre-
gard otherwise admissible evidence gained from such contact solely
because it was obtained in violation of a rule or order.79 In spite of
this, rules and orders limiting contact with jurors have gained wide
acceptance on both the federal and the state levels.80
D. Limiting the Grounds for Impeachment
Limiting the grounds available for impeachment of jury ver-
dicts is another approach.81 Presently, there are many available
grounds, such as: threats to jurors; misapprehension of jury in-
structions; jury mistake as to the effect of a verdict; introduction of
71 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126 (1987); United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749, 753-54
(5th Cir. 1983).
7 See United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (jurors have
right to be free from harassment).
78 See In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808-11 (5th Cir. 1982) (restriction on
journalistic right to gather news must be narrowly tailored); Note, supra note 18, at 897-904.
79 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126.
80 See supra note 76.
81 See, e.g., Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-26 (limiting grounds available for impeaching ver-
dict); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1956) (same); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140, 152 (1892) (same); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1075
(3d Cir. 1985) (same); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 141 (3d
Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
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items not in evidence into the jury room; quotient or compromise
verdicts; a misunderstanding of the facts; juror incompetence due
to mental problems, intoxication, or drug abuse; and unauthorized
exposure to media accounts of the proceedings.
Commentators have suggested that certain grounds should be
available for impeachment of jury verdicts, while others should
not,8 2 and at least a few courts have held that jury verdicts may be
impeached only on recognized grounds.8 In fact, some federal
courts have held that even if the evidence is admissible under Rule
606(b), the verdict is not subject to impeachment if the grounds
are not recognized. 4
This approach is based on the view that impeachment of a
jury verdict is appropriate for certain reasons or grounds and inap-
propriate for others. 5 For example, a court might hold that threats
against a juror constitute grounds for impeachment of a jury ver-
dict while a quotient or compromise verdict does not. In the latter
case, any attempt to impeach the verdict would be immediately
dismissed on the pleadings, because the ground upon which the
motion is based would not be recognized.
While this approach has achieved some limited recognition, it
is not without its shortcomings. It is very difficult to analyze and
categorize all of the possible grounds for impeachment and there-
after decide which ones merit recognition. Also, depending on the
facts of the case, a court may be inclined to recognize a ground for
impeachment that was rejected under different circumstances. Fi-
nally, any attempt to group the grounds into categories will, of ne-
cessity, give rise to definitional difficulties and problems of inclu-
sion and exclusion. 6
82 See Note, supra note 13, at 442; Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra
note 13, at 366-72.
83 See Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1078. "Any attempt to impeach a jury verdict initially
encounters two evidentiary obstacles: (1) producing evidence competent to attack the ver-
dict, and (2) establishing the existence of grounds recognized as adequate to overturn the
verdict." Id. (quoting Gereau, 523 F.2d at 148) (emphasis added).
84 Id.; see United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972, 977 (1976) (although consideration
of extra-record facts is prohibited, not necessary that jurors be "totally ignorant" about a
case).
85 See Kornstein, supra note 6, at 672-74; Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts,
supra note 13, at 366-72.
88 See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 366-72.
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E. Juror Privilege
An interesting but little used approach to the problem of im-
peachment of jury verdicts is the concept of juror privilege. 7 This
doctrine allows the juror to invoke a privilege in order to refuse to
respond to inquiries concerning his jury service. Like other privi-
leges, this privilege may be waived. In order for the privilege to
exist, four elements must be present:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal at litigation.88
By definition, the doctrine contains at least three exceptions where
evidence of the privileged communication is admissible: (1) where
the jury relationship is a sham and dishonestly assumed as a cover
for the concealment of the truth; (2) where it is decided that the
preservation of the privacy of jury deliberations is unnecessary to
promote a just and honest jury system; and (3) where it is deter-
mined that, on balance, other policies raised by the case are more
important. 9 The relatively broad language employed in the excep-
tions and the possibility of a coerced waiver may present problems
in applying these concepts to particular cases.90 Although the juror
privilege approach is recognized by the United States Supreme
Court' the doctrine has fallen into disuse.9 2
97 For an informative and detailed review of juror privilege, see Comment, Juror Privi-
lege, supra note 13, at 450-75.
Id. at 457 (citing 8 J. WGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (rev. ed. 1961)) (emphasis
omitted).
89 Id. at 464.
90 See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13.
91 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1933). For a discussion of the status of
the juror privilege approach, see Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 448-49.
92 See Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 448-49; see also United States ex
rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 820 n.7 (2d Cir. 1970) (discussing juror privilege), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
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F. The Parol Evidence Rule
Finally, the parol evidence rule may be used to limit impeach-
ment of jury verdicts. Professor Wigmore has maintained that the
jury verdict is an operative act similar to a will or a contract, and
therefore, the parol evidence rule applies. Since the verdict itself is
the act of legal significance, the thought processes, motives, and
beliefs of the individual jurors are immaterial, and jurors may
neither contradict nor explain the verdict. The verdict can be chal-
lenged on only two grounds: where the jurors have violated essen-
tial rules of behavior in arriving at the verdict, or where the verdict
does not correctly represent the assent of all the jurors.9 3 This the-
ory has received little acceptance or recognition. 4
III. RULE 606(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Viewed in the context of the law of impeachment of jury ver-
dicts, Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence may not be the
most significant approach. However, since it is the Federal Rule of
Evidence that deals directly, with this issue, Rule 606(b) has re-
ceived a great deal of attention and merits consideration. It is not
the purpose of this Article to engage in an in-depth examination of
the origins and history of the rule. Others have commendably ac-
complished that task.9 5 However, some acquaintance with the his-
torical background of the rule is useful.
A. The Common-Law Background
As we have seen, in 1785, Lord Mansfield established the rule
that a juror is incompetent to impeach a jury verdict and the rule
has been in effect to some extent since that time." Over the years,
two variations of the rule have evolved. First, an exception to the
11 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1197 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2345,
§§ 2349-2350, §§ 2352-2356 (rev. ed. 1961)).
N See Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 456.
" Tanner, 483 U.S. 107, 117-22 (1987); Alschuler, supra note 5, at 221-23; Crump,
supra note 5, at 513-22; Schlaff, Impeachment of Verdicts by Juror Testimony, 61 CONN.
BAR J. 215, 225-30 (1987); Thompson, supra note 9, at 1196-1206; Note, supra note 13, at
418-26; Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13,-at 360-65; Comment,
supra note 5, at 350-55, 358-59; Comment, Stability of Juror Verdicts, supra note 13, at
343-51; Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 450-56, 460-63.
9' See MueUer, supra note 6, at 924-27; Thompson, supra note 9, at 1196-97; Note,
supra note 13, at 418-21; Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 360-
64; Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 450-55.
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rule developed that permitted juror testimony as to "external in-
fluences" allegedly brought to bear upon the jury's decision. 7 The
second, known as the "Iowa Rule," excludes juror testimony as to
matters that "essentially inhere in the verdict itself," but admits
evidence of an "independent fact."98
In Mattox v. United States,99 the United States Supreme
Court adopted the first approach, holding that a juror would be
permitted to testify in a case where the jurors had been exposed to
outside information provided by a bailiff. In subsequent cases, the
federal courts followed Lord Mansfield's rule, but created an ex-
ception where it was alleged that "external influences" were
brought to bear upon the jury.100 It was this tradition that led to
the adoption of Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975.
B. The Legislative History of Rule 606(b)
The legislative history of Rule 606(b) has received a great deal
of attention101 and has been determinative in deciding some issues
related to the impeachment of jury verdicts."0 2 In the preliminary
draft of Rule 606(b), the Supreme Court Advisory Committee in-
corporated the broader policy of the Iowa Rule, permitting a juror
to testify as to statements or acts occurring during deliberations
and precluding only testimony concerning the effect that such
statements or acts had on the juror's mind or the decision. 0 3 The
final draft of the Advisory Committee sent to Congress followed
the common-law principles reflected in the federal approach pro-
scribing testimony concerning events that occurred during the
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
98 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
99 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
100 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117 (1987) (alleged use of narcotics and alcohol by jurors);
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 212 (1982) (juror in criminal trial submitted employment
application to District Attorney's office); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363-64 (1966)
(bailiff's comments on defendant); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954) (bribe
offered to juror); McDonald, 238 U.S. at 265-69 (quotient verdict rendered by jury); Hyde &
Schneider v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) (compromise verdict).
101 Mueller, supra note 6, at 927-32; Thompson, supra note 9, at 1202-05; Note, supra
note 13, at 424-26; Comment, Stability of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 365-66; Com-
ment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 460-63.
102 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122-25.
103 See FED. R. Evw. 606(b) (prelim. draft Mar. 31, 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161,
289-90 (1969); see also FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (rev. draft March 15, 1971), reprinted in 51
F.R.D. 315, 386-87 (1971).
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course of deliberations. This draft retained the common-law excep-
tion permitting juror testimony on external influences that were
brought to bear upon any juror.10 4
In its version, the House of Representatives reverted to the
Advisory Committee's preliminary draft's incorporation of the
Iowa Rule.105 However, this revision was rejected by the Senate,
which adopted the more restrictive common-law version.106 The
narrower Senate approach was adopted by the Conference Com-
mittee and ultimately enacted. 107
This legislative history is important for several reasons. From
a broad perspective, the debate and final result clearly reflect an
intent on the part of Congress to adopt a more restrictive approach
in formulating the provisions of Rule 606(b).0 8 Also, the extensive
debate, correspondence, and reports developed during the legisla-
tive process provide a fertile area for developing arguments in par-
ticular cases. 0 9 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, arguments
based on the legislative history are particularly convincing. 10
C. The Terms and Nature of Rule 606(b) I
Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence embodies the
common-law doctrine that, with certain exceptions, a juror may
not furnish evidence to impeach a jury's verdict."' Specifically, the
04 See FED. R. Evm. 606(b) (amended version, effective July 1, 1973), reprinted in 56
F.R.D. 183, 265 (1973).
105 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. Doc. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7083.
106 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. Doc. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7060.
107 HOUSE CONFERENCE COMM., H.R. Doc. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7102; Conference Report, 120 CONG.
REC. 33,941 (1974); see also Mueller, supra note 6, at 928-32 (detailed discussion of Senate
approach to analysis of rule); Thompson, supra note 9, at 1203-04 (same); Note, supra note
13, at 425-26 (same); Comment, Stability of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 365-66 (same);
Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 461-63 (same).
"I Mueller, supra note 6, at 932-33; Thompson, supra note 9, at 1203-05; Note, supra
note 13, at 426; Comment, Stability of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 365-66; Comment,
Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 463.
100 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122-25.
:1o Id.
11 See FED. R. EvID. 606(b). Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not tes-
tify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's delib-
erations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emo-
tions as influencing the jurors to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, ex-
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rule prohibits a juror from testifying "as to: [1] any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or
[2] the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind...
as to influencing jurors to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or [3] concerning the juror's mental processes in con-
nection therewith. '112
The rule provides for two exceptions when a juror may prop-
erly testify: (1) as to "whether extraneous prejudicial information
[was] brought to the jury's attention" or (2) as to "outside influ-
ence . . . improperly brought to bear upon any juror."113 Finally,
the rule provides that "a juror's affidavit or evidence of any state-
ment by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would
be precluded from testifying may not be received" 114 for the pur-
poses set forth in the rule. This provision effectively eliminates the
reception of any evidence of a juror's statement for these
purposes.""
Rule 606(b) specifies three areas in which the juror is incom-
petent to testify. However, these areas do not include all evidence
that could be obtained from a juror,"" and it appears that under
certain circumstances even evidence included in these areas may
be competent and therefore admissible. 7 The rule lists two excep-
tions and, although the terms of these exceptions are explicit, the
courts have experienced great difficulty in determining their exact
meaning.""
Rule 606(b) is an exclusionary rule in that it acts as a disin-
centive, discouraging parties from harassing jurors.1 19 Unlike other
exclusionary rules, it does not prevent the use of all evidence de-
cept that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial infor-
mation was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside in-
fluence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit
or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the





While our discussion has focused on impeachment of petit jury verdicts, Rule 606(b)
applies equally to grand juries and the impeachment of indictments. See Mueller, supra
note 6, at 965-72.
116 See infra notes 141-42.
" See infra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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rived from postverdict juror contact. While the rule precludes the
juror from presenting evidence, other evidence obtained as a result
of contact with jurors may be admitted.120
It is important to keep in mind that Rule 606(b) is a rule of
evidence applicable in all cases. By its terms, the rule is not con-
cerned with substantive matters such as the grounds for impeach-
ment of verdicts, 12' yet these matters may become important in
determining questions relating to, for example, whether the case
involves an outside influence. 122 Unlike procedural rules that per-
mit some discretion,'2 3 a rule of evidence must be applied consist-
ently in every case, and unlike a privilege,124 the rule may not be
waived by the protected party. More importantly, Rule 606(b) is
but one approach to the law of impeachment of jury verdicts and
in no way precludes the use of other approaches where they
apply.125
IV. THE Tanner CASE
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Tanner v. United
States,26 courts had frequently addressed the issue of impeach-
ment of jury verdicts. However, these decisions did little to resolve
the questions that had been recurring since Lord Mansfield's time.
At the heart of the matter was the issue of whether these questions
should be resolved in favor of protecting the individual jurors and
the jury system or ensuring that the verdict accurately reflected
the decision of a fair and impartial jury. In Tanner, the Supreme
Court determined, based in part on the legislative history of Rule
606(b), that this issue should be resolved in favor of protecting the
individual jurors and the jury system.127 In arriving at this conclu-
120 See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
222 See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
.2 See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
125 See Crump, supra note 5, at 532-43. Crump recognizes the relationship of at least
two approaches in her proposition that a change in rule 606(b) be accompanied by the adop-
tion of a court rule protecting jurors. See id.
120 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
'17 In Tanner, Justice O'Connor stated for the majority:
There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in
some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or
improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could
survive such efforts to perfect it. Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency,
or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the ver-
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sion, the Court noted and embraced virtually all of the policy con-
siderations militating in favor of protecting the jurors and their
verdicts, including concerns of juror exposure to postverdict pres-
sure, 128 the potential chilling effect on the deliberative process, 129
the need for finality, 310 and the interest of ensuring a fair trial.13'
The defendants in Tanner were convicted of mail fraud and
conspiring to defraud the United States. The district court had a
local rule barring posttrial interviews of jurors. Based on a juror's
statement to Tanner's attorney that several of the jurors consumed
alcohol at various times during the trial, the defendants filed a mo-
tion for permission to interview jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and
a new trial. The district court concluded that Rule 606(b) pre-
cluded the use of juror testimony, but invited the defendants to
adduce any nonjuror evidence at a hearing. A hearing was held at
which Tanner's counsel testified that he had noticed that one of
the jurors was in a "giggly mood" at one point during the trial. The
district court, after making other observations concerning the trial,
decided that it would not permit interviews of the jurors, nor
would it allow the jurors to testify at a hearing. The defendants
appealed.
While the appeal was pending, Tanner's attorney moved for a
for new trial. In the accompanying affidavit, the attorney related
an unsolicited visit he had received from a second juror. He then,
without leave of the court, arranged for the juror to be interviewed
two days later by private investigators. At the interview, the sec-
ond juror related that the jurors had engaged in the use of drugs
and alcohol during the trial, including the use of cocaine and mari-
juana. The district court again denied the defendants' motion for a
new trial and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. 32
dict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process. Moreover, full and frank discus-
sion in the jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the
community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all
be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct.
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21 (citation omitted). The fact that Justice Marshall chose to ad-
dress this policy-motivated statement in the final lines of his dissenting opinion attests to
its importance. Id. at 142 ( Marshall, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 119-20.
122 Id. at 120-21.
"s Id. at 120, 124-25.
See id. at 120. Implicitly, the Court exhibited a suspicion of postverdict allegations,
and concern regarding the effect of a hearing. See id. at 120, 126-27.
1'2 United States v. CQnover, 772 F.2d 765, 767 (11th Cir. 1985).
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,1 33 and
affirmed the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and the district
court on the issue of verdict impeachment.13 4 The Court, following
the policy disfavoring impeachment of verdicts, held that the al-
leged use of drugs and alcohol by jurors did not constitute an
"outside influence." Accordingly, juror testimony with respect to
these activities was inadmissible to overturn the verdict. 13 5 In
reaching this decision, the Court discussed several other matters
pertaining to the issue of jury verdict impeachment, such as the
constitutional implications,' the need for a hearing, 31 and the
propriety of court orders limiting postverdict contact with
jurors.""5
V. THE FUTURE OF THE LAW GOVERNING IMPEACHMENT OF JURY
VERDICTS
In recent years, the law governing impeachment of jury ver-
dicts has moved steadily in the direction of further restricting at-
tacks on verdicts. This is partly attributable to the Tanner deci-
sion, but the trend appears to be more broadly based, driven by
the courts' adoption of the policy arguments promoting this per-
spective. We will now survey these developments by examining the
effect that Tanner and its progeny have had on the individual ele-
ments of this body of law.
A. The Effect on Rule 606(b)
Since the Tanner holding deals directly with Rule 606(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, it has had a significant effect on the
development of the law relating to this rule. Not surprisingly, this
has lead to further limitations on the impeachment of jury
verdicts.
133 Tanner v. United States, 479 U.S. 929 (1986).
"1' Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127. The Court remanded the case on a second issue, whether
the defendants' actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United States within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 134.
"I' Id. at 125.
136 Id. at 126-27.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 126.
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1. Generally
Rule 606(b) is a rule of evidence that affects only the compe-
tency of the juror to testify. The rule purports to regulate the man-
ner in which proof is presented and does not address the grounds
upon which impeachment of a verdict is permitted.139 Use of a
competency rule to effectuate the important policy considerations
involved has been criticized as foreshadowing the demise of Rule
606(b). 140 However, the decision in Tanner makes it clear that the
vitality of the rule is not in question.
Litigation involving Rule 606(b) generally examines two issues.
First, whether the evidence falls within the terms of the rule; spe-
cifically, whether the evidence relates to a matter or statement that
occurred during the course of jury deliberations or to a juror's
mind, or the juror's mental processes. Second, if the evidence falls
within the rule, whether one of the exceptions applies. Further,
while the Tanner holding relates directly to defining the terms em-
ployed in the exceptions, the case will also affect future decisions
dealing with the first issue.
Decisions regarding whether evidence falls within the scope of
Rule 606(b) have not always been consistent.""' Courts have, how-
ever, held that Rule 606(b) does not apply to preverdict inquiries
directed at jurors or to the process of postverdict polling of the
jury.142 On the other hand, it would appear that the rule does ap-
ply to partial verdicts.143
Tanner holds that matters relating to juror competence such
as alcohol and drug use come within the scope of Rule 606(b).
139 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see also Alschuler, supra note 5, at 224-25 (noting that
rule is evidentiary, not substantive); Mueller, supra note 6, at 927 (purpose of rule is to
"regulate ... proof... not to set grounds upon which verdicts may be impeached").
10 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1221-29.
1 Compare Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1987) (evidence outside
rule inadmissible) with Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (court
may receive evidence of improper influence).
142 See, e.g., Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1978) (polling per-
missible), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); United States v. Khoury, 539 F.2d 441, 442
(5th Cir. 1976) (in camera interrogation permissible); see also Kornstein, supra note 6 (prior
to discharge jurors may be polled); Mueller, supra note 6, at 957-60 (rule inapplicable to
matters occurring before deliberation); Thompson, supra note 9, at 1207 (rule does not ap-
ply to "issues of misconduct or impropriety that are addressed prior to accepting the
verdict").
M43 United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978); see also Kornstein, supra note 6, at 668-69 (partial verdict may be considered final
and complete); Mueller, supra note 6, at 940-41 (same).
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More significantly, in making a strong statement against impeach-
ment of jury verdicts, the Court established a policy that will un-
doubtedly lead to a broader interpretation of the rule, resulting in
the inclusion of more situations within its scope.-44 This trend has
been reflected in at least two post-Tanner decisions that have held
that jurors' postverdict statements to the press are included within
the scope of Rule 606(b). One case involved a juror's statement
that in view of subsequent disclosures, he now had a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt.' 4 5 The other arose out of a juror's
assertion that although the jurors believed the defendant innocent,
they voted guilty due to time pressure. 4
2. The Exceptions to Rule 606(b)
Even where it appears that the exceptions to Rule 606(b) do
apply, questions have arisen regarding their application. These
cases usually deal with the nexus of the exception to the other pro-
visions of Rule 606(b). For example, it has been held that although
jurors may testify on the situation covered by the exception, they
may not testify as to other matters proscribed by the rule.147 Thus,
while jurors may give testimony concerning an external influence
that may have affected the jury, they may not testify regarding the
effect that the external influence had upon their minds or mental
processes, nor may they testify concerning their deliberations. The
difficult task of enforcing these distinctions and controlling the ju-
ror's testimony is left to the judge presiding at the hearing.
Most litigation in this area involves the question of the appli-
cability of the exceptions. Confusion arises because some courts
tend to discuss the two exceptions together, merging them into one
concept. 4 1 However, even if one is careful to separate the concepts
and speak in terms of either "outside influence" or "extraneous
prejudicial information," problems may arise. Difficulties usually
'4 See Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1208-09 (5th Cir.) (juror's misinterpreta-
tion of trial court's instructions constitutes "juror's mental processes" within Rule 606(b)),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051 (1989).
', United States v. Sjekloca, 843 F.2d 485, 488 (11th Cir. 1988).
146 United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988).
147 United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1069 (1989); Urseth v. City of Dayton, 680 F. Supp. 1084, 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Braley
v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Wyo. 1987).
"' United States v. Black, 843 F.2d 1456, 1464 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v.
Boylan, 698 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 139 (1990).
(Vol. 65:389
19911 IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS
arise due to the breadth of the terms that define the exceptions.
This gives the courts a great deal of latitude in determining
whether a case falls within one of the exceptions. 149 While this ex-
pansive terminology may be necessary to effect the purposes of
Rule 606(b), it has made application of the rule more difficult and
has led to inconsistent results.150
Defining the term "outside influence" has proved particularly
troublesome, and it is in this area that the Tanner decision will
have the greatest impact. In the past, courts addressing this ques-
tion have frequently arrived at conflicting results.151 Therefore, it
was very difficult to classify their opinions. 52 The policy set forth
in Tanner of upholding jury verdicts will undoubtedly have an im-
pact upon future decisions,' 3 especially in light of the exception's
broad terms. In addition, the Tanner court in dealing with this
issue rejected with strong words the claim that drug and alcohol
use by jurors falls within the exception. 15 4 The Tanner decision
may even raise doubts as to whether juror incompetence can ever
be considered an outside influence. At a minimum, we can expect
that post-Tanner decisions will adopt a restrictive view of the ex-
ception. To a certain extent this policy has already been reflected
in the decisions.' 55
149 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118 (1987); Black, 843 F.2d at 1464 n.7.
190 Mueller, supra note 6, at 951-56; Thompson, supra note 9, at 1205. The difficulty of
the problem is demonstrated by the fact that prior to Tanner it was thought that alcohol or
drug use by a juror constituted an "outside influence." Mueller, supra note 6, at 952-53. For
a comprehensive review of pre-Tanner case law interpreting the term "outside influence,"
see id. at 951-56. For an overall review of pre-Tanner case law pertaining to jury miscon-
duct, see Comment, Stability of Juror Verdicts, supra note 13, at 348-63.
" See United States v. Schultz, 656 F. Supp 1218, 1221 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
12 See supra note 150.
'83 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
1" In Tanner, Justice O'Connor stated, "[h]owever severe their effect and improper
their use, drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an 'outside influ-
ence' than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep." Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122.
5 See United States v. Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d 485, 487 (11th Cir. 1988) (juror statement
that due to developments in Iran-Contra matter he would now acquit inadmissible to im-
peach verdict); United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988) (juror state-
ment that some jurors believed defendant innocent, but changed minds due to time pressure
inadmissible to impeach verdict); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1987)
(racial comment by juror inadmissible to impeach verdict); United States v. Sokoloff, 696 F.
Supp. 1451, 1455-56 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (juror statements as to pressure and insufficiency of
government's case inadmissible to impeach verdict), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cathel,
903 F.2d 1381 (1990); Salter v. Watkins, 513 So.2d 569, 572 (Miss. 1987) (testimony as to
foreperson's refusal to return vote of adequate number for verdict inadmissible to impeach
verdict); Shamburger v. Behrens, 418 N.W.2d 299, 304 (S.D. 1988) (testimony as to juror's
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Interpretation of the term "extraneous information" has gen-
erally proved to be less troublesome. For example, there is little
doubt that the exception applies in a case where the jurors have
been provided with prejudicial information not admitted into evi-
dence.156 Nonetheless, difficult questions may arise in cases involv-
ing racial comments, 57 jury notice,5 8 and in other contexts.6 9 In
such cases, the policy enunciated in Tanner may also have an
effect. °6 0
3. Other Exceptions
There are only two exceptions specifically set forth in Rule
606(b): the "outside influence" exception and the "extraneous
attempt to extort money from prevailing party inadmissible to impeach verdict).
"' See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 143-44 (1892) (newspaper article
prejudicial to accused read to jury during deliberations).
... See Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 919-22 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (juror
handed bailiff napkin with drawing of man on gallows above inscription exhibiting racial
hatred); Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (testimony of racial bias
based on juror's conduct may be admissible if it appears death penalty imposed on basis of
defendant's race); see also Crump, supra note 5, at 524-25 (racial bias, though not clearly
"extraneous information," may result in juror conduct offensive to fundamental fairness);
Note, supra note 18, at 894-95 (most jurors are prejudiced against those culturally differ-
ent); Note, Racial Slurs by Jurors as Grounds for Impeaching a Jury's Verdict: State v.
Shillcutt, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1481, 1482 [hereinafter Note, Racial Slurs] (discussion of racial
bias as grounds for impeaching jury verdict).
18 Jury notice refers to the general knowledge that jurors bring with them to their jury
service. For an interesting and informative article on this subject, and a discussion of poten-
tial problems, see Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395 passim (1985); see also Note,
supra note 13, at 427 n.66 (jurors expected to use commonly known facts not introduced at
trial).
159 See Mueller, supra note 6, at 943-51 (comprehensive review of pre-Tanner case law
interpreting term "extraneous prejudicial information"); Comment, Stability of Jury Ver-
dicts, supra note 13, at 348-63 (review of pre-Tanner cases pertaining to jury misconduct).
10 Since the Tanner decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit has dealt with two classic cases of extraneous information, and has reaffirmed that im-
peachment of the verdict will be permitted in such cases. See Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d
740, 743-46 (4th Cir. 1988) (extrajudicial communication to juror by third party), cert. de-
nied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989); Stephens v. South Atl. Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir.)
(prejudicial items not admitted into evidence introduced into the jury room), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 996 (1988). However, the Seventh Circuit has refused to permit impeachment of
the jury's verdict on the basis of a racial comment made by a juror. See Shillcutt v. Gagnon,
827 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1987) ("proper time to discover such prejudices is when the
jury is being selected and peremptory challenges are available to the attorneys") (quoting
United States v. Dunzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980));
see also Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 1093 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (sufficient
cause for hearing to determine whether verdict was result of racial prejudice).
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prejudicial information" exception. 16' Courts and scholars, how-
ever, have recognized exceptions to Rule 606(b) ithat are not set
forth in Rule 606(b) or its legislative history. These exceptions in-
clude: the egregious situation exception, the clerical error excep-
tion, and the perjury on voir dire exception. There can be little
doubt that, while the propriety of recognizing these exceptions
may be questionable, they do in fact exist.
a. The common-law egregious situation exception
The term "common law egregious situation exception" de-
scribes the concept that although evidence obtained from a juror
may be barred by Rule 606(b), such evidence may be admitted in
cases of extreme prejudice. While neither the terms of the excep-
tion nor its basis have been clearly defined, support for the doc-
trine is found in some federal decisions, including those of the
United States Supreme Court. In the 1915 case of McDonald v.
Pless,6 2 the Court ruled that the jurors were incompetent to tes-
tify, but noted that "it would not be safe to lay down any inflexible
rule because there might be instances in which such testimony of
the juror could not be excluded without 'violating the plainest
principles of justice.' ",163
McDonald was decided long before Rule 606(b) was enacted,
but cases decided since its enactment have indicated that the doc-
trine enjoys continued vitality. The Tanner Court did not specifi-
cally adopt the principle, but acknowledged that the common-law
egregious situation exception may continue to exist.' More re-
cently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
noted, "further review may be necessary in the occasional case in
order to discover the extremely rare abuse that could exist even
161 FED. R. Evm. 606(b).
6-2 38 U.S. 264 (1915).
.6 Id. at 268-69 (referring to Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) and United
States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851)).
16, See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125. In Tanner, Justice O'Connor stated that "even if Rule
606(b) is interpreted to retain the common-law exception allowing post-verdict inquiry of
juror incompetence in cases of 'substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompe-
tency,'.., the showing made by petitioners falls far short of this standard." Id. (citations
omitted). Justice O'Connor noted, "[t]hese allegations would not suffice to bring this case
under the common-law exception allowing post-verdict inquiry when an extremely strong
showing of incompetency has been made." Id. at 126. Thus, while the Supreme Court in
Tanner did not apply the doctrine, it certainly acknowledged the possibility that there may
be a common-law egregious situation exception to Rule 606(b), at least in cases of alleged
juror incompetency. Id. at 125-26.
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after the court has applied [Rule 606(b)] and determined the evi-
dence incompetent. '" 1 5
It is rather unusual for the courts to retain a common-law ex-
ception where neither the drafters of the rule nor Congress in-
tended to do so. One reason for the courts continued recognition of
the egregious situation exception may be that if the alleged impro-
priety is so serious as to deny a party due process of law, constitu-
tional requirements will override the specific terms of Rule
606(b).1 6  Whatever the reason, the common-law egregious situa-
tion exception to Rule 606(b) does appear to have continued
vitality.
b. The clerical error exception
Another exception not found in Rule 606(b) but recognized by
the courts is the "clerical error" exception. This exception is gener-
ally viewed as permitting consideration of juror affidavits and
other forms of evidence to prove that the verdict was reported er-
roneously or that the verdict was never agreed upon by the requi-
site number of jurors.16 7 The federal courts have distinguished be-
tween the impermissible practice of "interrogat[ing] a juror
concerning what he meant by his verdict," and the use of a juror's
affidavit "to show that the verdict delivered was not that actually
agreed upon," which is permitted.168 The courts have also held that
a juror affidavit is admissible "to show the true verdict or that no
verdict was reached at all."'69 While these cases were decided
before the enactment of Rule 606(b), at least one scholar is of the
opinion that the clerical error exception will survive in the federal
system. °70 It has also gained acceptance on the state level.' 7 '
The clerical error exception has been defined differently in
Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987).
"' See id. "The rule of juror incompetency cannot be applied in such an unfair manner
as to deny due process." Id.
187 See Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (5th Cir.) (inquiries not covered
by Rule 606(b) because they do not concern jury's internal processes), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1051 (1989); Mueller, supra note 6, at 958-59 (polling of jury clearly not prohibited by Rule
606(b)).
18 Mueller, supra note 6, at 958 n.149 (quoting University Computing Co. v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 547 n.43 (5th Cir. 1974)).
169 Id. (quoting Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1969)).
"0 See id.; see also Robles, 862 F.2d at 1207-08 (dicta supporting clerical exception).
171 See Note, Jury Impeachment: The Illusory Clerical Error Exception, 63 U. DET. L.
REV. 499, 501-08 (1986) (discussing clerical error exception with reference to exclusionary
rule).
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various jurisdictions. Some courts have held that it covers errors
that appear on the face of the verdict as well as errors in recording
the intended verdict of the jury. Other courts have limited its ap-
plication to cases where the error appears on the face of the ver-
dict. 7 2 One jurisdiction has recently decided that a court may in-
quire into and correct a clerical error in the verdict while the jury
is still sitting, but that such an error may not be corrected after
the jury is discharged. 73 Although this Article will not engage in
an in-depth examination of this concept, 7 4 it would appear that,
the exception, if interpreted broadly, could consume the rule. In
any event, many jurisdictions continue to recognize the clerical er-
ror exception to some degree.
c. Perjury on voir dire and related exceptions
Generally, Rule 606(b) does not apply to inquiries made by
the court prior to the verdict. 7 5 Some courts have used this princi-
ple to permit otherwise inadmissible evidence regarding certain
pre-deliberation activities, such as a juror's commission of perjury
on voir dire. 76 It is questionable whether the postverdict admis-
sion of such evidence can be justified solely on the basis that it
involves a pre-deliberation event, particularly if the basis for the
allegation of perjury was revealed by the juror during the jury's
deliberations.'
Nonetheless, at least one court has made the unqualified state-
ment that inquiries into allegations of perjury constitute an excep-
tion to Rule 606(b). Therefore, even statements allegedly made by
a juror during deliberations tending to prove such perjury are ad-
.7' See id.
173 See Chandler v. U-Line Corp., 91 N.C. App. 315, 324-25, 371 S.E.2d 717, 722-23
(1988).
174 For a thoughtful and informative review of this matter, see Note, supra note 171, at
505-08.
175 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
176 See United States v. Robbins, 500 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1974) (ruling on questions
of jury impartiability is within discretion of trial judge); cf. Salter v. Watkins, 513 So. 2d
569, 573 (Miss. 1987) (juror's failure to acknowledge, on voir dire, knowledge of party as
"outside influence" comes under exception).
177 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117-18. In Tanner, most, if not all of the narcotic and
alcohol use occurred before the jury's deliberations. Id. at 115-16. However the Supreme
Court found that the activities were covered by rule 606(b). Id. at 122. "Clearly a rigid
distinction based only on whether the event took place inside or outside the jury room
would ... [be] quite unhelpful." Id. at 117-18.
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missible 7 1 Such holdings would appear to create a new "perjury
on voir dire" exception to Rule 606(b). This may be attributable to
simple expediency, based on a view that perjury on voir dire is in-
tolerable, and if the only evidence of the perjury occurred during
the jury's deliberations, it must be admitted even if it would not be
competent under the provisions of Rule 606(b). Similar concerns
could be raised with regard to other situations, such as a juror's
admission of criminal conduct.
While the creation by the courts of new exceptions not specifi-
cally set forth in Rule 606(b) is perhaps necessary, such action is
fraught with danger. Each new exception creates inroads into the
policies and interests protected by the rule, and care must be exer-
cised to ensure that the exceptions do not ultimately undermine
the rule.
4. Impeachment of a Jury Verdict by Nonjuror Evidence
Rule 606(b) does not preclude impeachment of jury verdicts.
Rather, with certain exceptions, it prevents the use of a juror's
statement or affidavit to impeach the verdict. Thus, by its terms
Rule 606(b) impliedly permits the impeachment of jury verdicts by
the use of nonjuror evidence not otherwise excluded by the rule.
This was acknowledged by the Tanner Court when it noted that
the trial court held a hearing and permitted the parties to adduce
nonjuror evidence. 1' 7 Thus, evidence of the observations of counsel
and court personnel, i80 documentary evidence,' s ' circumstantial ev-
idence, 82 and even the testimony of an eavesdropper,"' may be
admissible to impeach a jury verdict.'
178 See Urseth v. City of Dayton, 680 F. Supp. 1084, 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1987). In Urseth,
the court stated:
The scope of Rule 606(b) ... does not extend to allegations of juror perjury
on voir dire. Thus, statements made by a juror during deliberations (or prior
thereto), which would tend to indicate that he or she had perjured himself or
herself on voir dire, are not excluded by the rule, and so are competent, admissible
evidence under the general provisions of Rule 601.
Id. (citations omitted); see Note, supra note 13, at 432-33 (perjury on voir dire exception
recognized in Minnesota).
:79 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
"o See id. at 113.
181 See id. at 127 (citing United States v. Taliaferro, 558 F.2d 724, 725-26 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978)).
182 See Mueller, supra note 6, at 927.
183 See id.
18, The admission of nonjuror evidence to impeach a jury verdict has led to criticism of
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B. Procedural Requirements
The application of procedural rules, such as requiring a
threshold showing, allocation of burden of proof, vesting discretion
in the trial court, and authorization of a finding of harmless error
have led to restrictions on the impeachment of jury verdicts. These
rules will profoundly affect the outcome of a case and may even be
determinative, particularly when they are applied together. For ex-
ample, if it is held in a specific case that the attacking party must
make a threshold showing, that the attacking party has the burden
of proof, that the trial court has broad discretion in preserving the
verdict, and that any error may be held to be harmless on appeal,
it will be extremely difficult to overturn a verdict. On the other
hand, if it is held that there is no requirement of a threshold show-
ing, that the party seeking to sustain the verdict has the burden of
proof, that the trial court has no discretion in preserving the ver-
dict, and that no error will be harmless, verdicts will be overturned
more easily.
In practice, these rules are applied simultaneously and each
has an effect upon the other. It is therefore difficult to view each
rule in isolation. However, for purposes of this discussion, each will
be examined separately.
1. Requirement of a Threshold Showing
Courts have held that before a postverdict inquiry will be au-
thorized and initiated, the party seeking to impeach the verdict
must make some showing that the allegations have merit. 85 The
quantum of proof required for this initial showing has ranged from
rule 606(b). One commentator has noted that, regardless of the prejudicial effect of juror
misconduct, the determination of whether or not a litigant will rece ive a new trial will de-
pend solely on whether a person other than a juror witnessed the misconduct. See Note,
supra note 13, at 442-43.
185 See Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1203 (1st Cir.) (petitioner's showing of partial-
ity insufficient to justify recall of juror), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985) (defendant failed to meet
"substantial burden" necessary to procure evidentiary hearing); United States v. Dioguardi,
492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir.) ("substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence" required for hear-
ing), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); United States v. Sokoloff, 696 F. Supp. 1451, 1456
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (court need not investigate juror misconduct absent reliable accusation),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Mueller,
supra note 6, at 960 (petitioner must ordinarily make preliminary showing of misconduct
sufficient to impeach with supporting evidence).
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"strong evidence,"'186 to a requirement that the party demonstrate
the need for an inquiry by "clear and incontrovertible evidence. "187
Obviously, requiring that the party seeking to initiate a postverdict
inquiry make an initial showing of the need based on "clear and
incontrovertible evidence" substantially reduces the probability
that such an inquiry will be undertaken and that the verdict will
be impeached.
Even more significant is the requirement that such an initial
showing be made before a party will be permitted to interview ju-
rors. As previously noted, courts have by both court rule and court
order placed limitations on postverdict contact with jurors, includ-
ing provisions that parties may contact jurors only upon leave of
the court. 88 At least one federal appellate court has upheld the
trial court's refusal to grant such leave where the party failed to
make the required threshold showing.1 89 This makes it extremely
difficult to impeach a verdict, particularly if the party is required
to make a showing based on "clear and incontrovertible" evidence.
The attacking party will, in most cases, fail to meet this burden
without information that can be obtained only from the jurors.
2. Burden of Proof
Authorities generally agree that the burden of proof lies with
the party seeking to attack the verdict. 90 Government of the Vir-
gin Islands v. Nicholas'9' is one of the more important cases ad-
dressing this issue. Nicholas was decided solely on the issue of bur-
den of proof and the opinion includes a review of the relevant case
18I Dioguardi, 492 F.2d at 78.
187 Id. at 79; see King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 850 (1978). In King, the court stated, "[t]o overcome this reluctance [to inquire into
jury deliberations] and to authorize a post-verdict inquiry, there must be 'clear evidence,'
'strong evidence,' 'clear and incontrovertible evidence,' 'substantial if not wholly conclusive
evidence.'" Id. (quoting Dioguardi, 492 F.2d at 78-80).
188 See supra notes 76-77.
188 See United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Tanner,
483 U.S. 107 (1987)).
198 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1077-81 (3d Cir.
1985); Shamburger v. Behrens, 418 N.W.2d 299, 302 (S.D. 1988); Crump, supra note 5, at
531.
191 759 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1985). The Nicholas case was cited with approval in Tanner,
483 U.S. at 118-20, 125. Although the Supreme Court decided Tanner on the issue of exter-
nal influence, it did note that, in attempting to prove a common law exception to rule
606(b), the burden of proof would fall on the party seeking to impeach the verdict. See id.
at 125-26.
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law on this question. The court in Nicholas determined that the
burden rests with the party seeking to impeach the verdict and
that the burden is substantial. 192
However, the matter is complicated by the discussion in the
decisions regarding the presence or absence of presumptions, im-
plied bias, and the need to prove prejudice. In Remmer v. United
States, 83 the Supreme Court held that a presumption of prejudice
arises in a criminal case where there is improper communication or
contact with a juror during the trial, and that the burden rests
heavily upon the government to establish that the contact was
harmless. More recently, in Smith v. Phillips,' the Court declined
to imply bias on the part of a juror who submitted an application
for employment to the district attorney's office during the trial.'95
Some courts have read Smith to have shifted the burden of proof
to the party alleging improper contact with a juror, 96 while others
have interpreted it to have retained the rule laid down in Rem-
mer. 9 7 Similarly, some courts have held that a presumption of
prejudice continues to attach in cases of improper external contact
with a juror,198 while others hold that, in light of Smith, prejudice
192 In Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1081, in a section of the opinion entitled "Burden of
Proof," the court concluded:
The Dioguardi court indicated that "[t]he rule against any inquiry whatever rec-
ognizes exceptions only where there is a clear and uncontrovertible evidence of
incompetence shortly before or after jury service." It cannot be seriously con-
tended that the present case satisfies the Dioguardi standard. In this case it is
sufficient to rule that defendant's evidence does not have that "strong showing"
and clarity which would require an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate issue of
what [juror] Fleming did or did not hear during the trial.
Id. (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
103 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
104 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
"I Id. at 215; see Note, Constitutional Law-Juror Bias-Posttrial Hearing to Determine
Actual Juror Bias Held Sufficient to Satisfy Due Process Rights, Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.
Ct. 940 (1982), 66 MARQ. L. REv. 400 passim (1983).
108 See United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1158 (1985); see also Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 425 n.4, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 n.4
(1988) (discussing conflict among federal circuits).
197 See Stephens v. South Atl. Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 996 (1988); see also Eades, 75 Md. App. at 425 n.4, 541 A.2d at 1008 n.4. "The
majority of the federal appellate courts hold that, when a presumption of prejudice arises
from an improper juror contact, the government bears the burden of establishing that the
improper juror contact was harmless to the defendant." Id.
18' Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 1988) (rebuttable presumption of
prejudice attaches to impermissible communication), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989);
Stephens, 848 F.2d at 486 (presumption of prejudice if contacts are "more than innocuous
interventions") (quoting Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1539 n.9 (4th Cir.
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is no longer presumed.199 These cases reveal the difficulties that
arise when the various grounds for impeachment of jury verdicts
are treated differently and presumptions are introduced into the
decision-making process.
3. Trial Court Discretion
Another procedural matter that may have a significant effect
on the outcome of cases is the amount of discretion given to the
trial court in determining whether to initiate a postverdict inquiry
or hearing. In every case where there is a claim of improper juror
conduct, external influence upon a juror, or similar grounds for
verdict impeachment, the trial court will be required to make a
determination of whether further inquiry is warranted. In reaching
this decision, the court will consider not only the nature of the al-
legations, but also whether the law requires an initial showing and,
if so, whether that showing has been made. 00 The question then
becomes how much discretion, if any, does the trial court have in
deciding whether to initiate a postverdict inquiry or to hold a
hearing.
A review of the case law reveals that the trial court has broad
discretion in this area.2 0 1 This is based in part on the fact that the
trial judge was present throughout the proceedings, had the ability
to observe the jurors and the parties, and otherwise gained an "on-
the-scene" perspective of the matter.0 2 Whatever the reason, the
resulting "abuse of discretion" standard on appeal 20 3 makes it
more difficult to impeach jury verdicts.
Perhaps even more important is the discretion reposed in the
trial court in determining whether to permit parties to have
postverdict contact with jurors. As previously noted, many courts,
by court rule or court order, have imposed the requirement that a
party obtain leave of court before initiating such contact. Obvi-
1986)); Eades, 75 Md. App. at 425, 541 A.2d at 1007 (court assumes Remmer is valid);
Crump, supra note 5, at 531 (party alleging misconduct aided by presumption of prejudice).
IO' See, e.g., Pennell, 737 F.2d at 532 (Smith applies generally to allegations of jury
partiality).
20 See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
20 See Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1075; United States v. Piccarreto, 718 F. Supp. 1088, 1090
(W.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Boylan, 698 F. Supp. 376, 388 (D. Mass. 1988), affd, 898
F.2d 230 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 139 (1990); Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257
(Del. 1988); Crump, supra note 5, at 531.
2 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125; Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1077.
203 See Massey, 541 A.2d at 1257.
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ously, if a litigant is not permitted to communicate with jurors it
will be very difficult for the party to satisfy the requisite quantum
of evidence to initiate a postverdict inquiry. It has been held that
the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to permit a party
to have postverdict contact with a juror."" Here again, if the trial
court declines to permit such contact, the decision will be reversed
only upon a finding of abuse of discretion, and thus, there is little
likelihood that the jury verdict will be impeached. 0 5
4. Hearing Requirement
The importance of whether a party is entitled to a hearing is
immediately apparent. If no hearing is held, it will be extremely
difficult for the party seeking to attack the jury verdict to establish
that the verdict should be impeached. On the other hand, the
holding of a hearing at which jurors are called to testify may offend
many of the policy considerations underlying Rule 606(b). 0
Consistent with the recent trend restricting the impeachment
of jury verdicts, courts have exhibited an increasing reluctance to
hold hearings at which jurors may be called to testify. The Tanner
Court specifically refused to grant such a hearing, holding that the
defendants' constitutional right to an unimpaired jury was pro-
tected by other facets of the trial process. 0 7 Similarly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that in a
case of alleged juror incompetency, no hearing is required. 20 8 While
earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with external influences sup-
port the holding of a hearing,209 recent case law gives rise to doubts
204 United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988).
205 See id.
20 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
207 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126-27. It should be noted that in Tanner, the trial court
granted a hearing and permitted the introduction of non-juror evidence. Id. For a criticism
of the Court's refusal to grant a second hearing, see Comment, supra note 5, at 371-75.
200 Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1490 (1990); Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1081; United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80-81 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); see also Note, Criminal Law-Postverdict Hearings
on Juror Incompetence-Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1985), 59 TEMP.
L.Q. 199, 206-09 (1986) (federal treatment of allegation of juror incompetence).
200 See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215; Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. Dissenting opinions have
frequently taken issue with the denial of a hearing in these situations. See, e.g., Andrews v.
Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 919-22 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Tanner, 483 U.S. at 135
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at 222
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1087 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
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as to the continued vitality of those holdings, particularly in other
contexts.
5. Harmless Error
Impeachment of jury verdicts implicates issues of constitu-
tional dimension.21 0 Therefore, it must be decided whether an error
at the trial level will automatically require reversal, or whether the
error may be viewed as harmless. 21'
The courts have held with some consistency that errors relat-
ing to impeachment of jury verdicts may be deemed harmless. 21 2 It
has also been held that a party seeking to impeach a verdict must
demonstrate prejudice.1 3 Since most appeals are taken from the
trial court's refusal to permit the impeachment of the jury verdict,
these holdings are of great practical significance. The application
of the harmless error doctrine and the requirement of proof of
prejudice will result in fewer reversals and, accordingly, fewer jury
verdicts will be overturned.
C. Juror Privilege
Although the policy considerations that give rise to juror privi-
lege are the same as those underlying the juror incompetency ap-
proach embodied in Rule 606(b), juror privilege is different in both
210 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (applying "harmless consti-
tutional error" test).
212 See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120-22 (1983); United States v. Hornung, 848
F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069 (1989); Shillcut v. Gagnon,
827 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1987); People v. Oliver, 196 Cal. App. 3d 423, 435-36, 241
Cal. Rptr. 804, 811-12 (1987).
212 Appellate courts have refused to disturb lower court decisions upholding verdicts
solely on the basis of a party's failure to demonstrate prejudice. Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1158-
60; Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 1988); see also Frank v. Brookhart, 877 F.2d
671, 675 (8th Cir. 1989) (convicted defendant failed to establish prejudice based on news
accounts of missing witnesses), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 736 (1990); Nicholas, 759 F.2d at
1078 ("defendant's evidence does not have that 'strong showing' and clarity which would
require an evidentiary hearing"); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,
148 (3d Cir. 1975) (government met its burden of establishing that no prejudice resulted
from statements made to juror by court personnel), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976);
United States v. Boylan, 698 F. Supp. 376, 387 (D. Mass. 1988) (defendant failed to estab-
lish prejudice caused by newspaper and magazine articles present in jury room), aff'd, 898
F.2d 230 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 139 (1990).
This issue may be complicated by questions of whether prejudice should be presumed
in certain cases, such as those involving improper contact with a juror and, if so, whether
that presumption has been rebutted. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
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its terms and effect.1 4 It is immediately apparent that Rule 606(b)
may apply in situations where juror privilege has no application,
and that the opposite may also be true. Unlike a rule of evidence
which must be applied consistently in every case, the 'terms of the
privilege provide the court with discretion in determining whether
it should be applied in a particular case.215 Also, this privilege, like
any other privilege, may be waived. 21e Although this doctrine has
fallen into disuse in recent years, it has been recognized by the
Supreme Court and appears to be a viable concept.217
D. Limiting the Grounds for Impeachment
Limiting the grounds for impeaching a jury's verdict is an ef-
fective approach to the problem of verdict impeachment and it has
been suggested that this approach be adopted by the courts.218 Al-
though Rule 606(b) does not address the issue, courts are at liberty
to limit the grounds available to impeach a verdict and some have
indicated a willingness to do so. For example, the Third Circuit has
taken the position that a jury verdict may be overturned only if
the attacking party establishes the existence of grounds recognized
as adequate for impeachment.1 9
Although there are many possible grounds for overturning a
verdict and the courts have considered the issue of jury verdict im-
peachment on numerous occasions, the decisions generally are
based on issues other than the validity of the grounds asserted.22 °
214 See Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 464-74; see also supra note 88 and
accompanying text (list of requisite elements of juror privilege).
220 See Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 464-74.
216 See id. at 465; see also Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13
(lawyers seek waiver of privilege to overturn verdict).
2'7 Professor Wigmore's juror privilege was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 18 (1933), however, it has not gained wide
acceptance. See Comment, Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 448-50, 464-74. Nonetheless,
the doctrine has been mentioned in at least one recent opinion. See Eades v. State, 75 Md.
App. 411, 417, 541 A.2d 1001, 1004 (1988). Some scholars prefer the juror privilege doctrine
to the doctrine of juror incompetence. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1222-23; Comment,
Juror Privilege, supra note 13, at 464-74.
216 See Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, supra note 13, at 365-66; see also
Kornstein, supra note 6, at 672-74 (listing various grounds for impeachment).
2'19 See Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1078 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ger-
eau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976)). Although Tanner
does not address this issue directly, there appears to be nothing in the decision that would
preclude the limitation of potential grounds.
220 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126-27; Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1207-09 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051 (1989); United States v. Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d 485, 488-89
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Nonetheless, this appears to be a fertile area for the courts and
counsel to explore. An argument could be advanced that, based on
precedent involving similar situations, the grounds alleged are not
recognized as adequate to overturn a verdict. Conversely, it would
be incumbent upon a party seeking to impeach a verdict to demon-
strate that the grounds alleged have been recognized as adequate.
One of the shortcomings in using this approach is the diffi-
culty of determining which of the many possible grounds will be
recognized and which will not. In addition, a particular ground
may deserve recognition in an egregious case, while it may lack
merit in a less serious situation. Despite these difficulties, the pos-
sibility of limiting the grounds for impeachment does exist.
E. Court Limitations on Contact With Jurors
One of the most important and controversial approaches to
the issue of impeachment of jury verdicts involves restrictions im-
posed by the courts on postverdict contact with jurors. There are
many possible alternatives in this area, ranging from the imposi-
tion of conditions on contact with jurors to the total proscription
of such contact.
The importance of such limitations is obvious, for if a party is
precluded from interviewing jurors, the probability of that party's
impeaching a verdict is substantially diminished. There is a danger
that such limitations may prevent litigants from learning of egre-
gious situations where the impeachment of the verdict is appropri-
ate.22' When such limitations are imposed on third parties and the
press, first amendment issues are implicated.222 On the other hand,
most of the policy considerations previously discussed militate in
favor of protecting jurors from dissatisfied litigants and other post-
trial harassment. Indeed, the constitutional right to trial by a fair
and impartial jury may require that jurors be afforded some pro-
tection. Jurors, with what appears to be increasing frequency, are
being pursued and harassed by both litigants and members of the
(11th Cir. 1988); Kornstein, supra note 6, at 673 n.68; see also Comment, Stability of Jury
Verdicts, supra note 13, at 351-63 (analysis of cases pertaining to specific areas of juror
misconduct).
221 See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1221.
222 See In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982); Note, supra note
18, at 897-902; Recent Development, Posttrial Juror Interviews by the Press: The Fifth
Circuit's Approach, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 783, 783 (1985).
[Vol. 65:389
IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS
media.223 Such actions may restrict freedom of discussion in the
jury room, inhibit jurors from reaching unpopular verdicts, in-
crease the likelihood that jurors will, for self-protection, make re-
marks in an effort to disassociate themselves from the verdict, and
lead to an unwillingness on the part of the public to serve as
jurors.224
Many courts have adopted rules restricting postverdict contact
with jurors and these limitations have taken many forms.225 It ap-
pears that the most common limitation is a requirement that liti-
gants must obtain leave of the court before communicating with
jurors. Such rules and orders have been upheld by the federal ap-
pellate courts.226 The courts, however, have not approved limita-
tions on posttrial media contact with jurors.227
In Tanner, the Supreme Court, for the first time, implicitly
approved a limitation on postverdict contact with jurors.22 s Inter-
estingly, the Court stated that violation of a rule limiting such con-
tact could, in and of itself, constitute grounds for disregarding evi-
dence gained as a result of the interview. 229 This is a significant
development in that it now appears that evidence of an egregious
situation that would be admissible under Rule 606(b) could be dis-
regarded by a court solely on the ground that the evidence was
obtained in violation of a court rule or order limiting posttrial con-
tact with jurors.
Perhaps even more significant is the increased use of anony-
mous juries where, pursuant to a court order, the names and ad-
223 See Sjeklocha, 843 F.2d at 488; Note, supra note 18, at 886-87.
224 See supra notes 12-39 and accompanying text.
225 See United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988); Haeberle v. Texas
Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984); Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d at 810;
United States v. Sokoloff, 696 F. Supp. 1451, 1457 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd sub noma. United
States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1990); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Wyo.
1987); Mueller, supra note 6, at 933-34; Recent Development, supra note 222, at 783.
226 See Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1159; Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1021; Note, supra note 18, at
899-902; Recent Development, supra note 222, at 786.
"' See In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982); Note, supra note
18, at 897-902; Recent Development, supra note 222, at 787. But see Gannett Co. v. Dela-
ware, 571 A.2d 735, 751 (Del. Super. Ct.) (upholding trial court's decision to prevent publi-
cation of information to press and others), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1947 (1990). The question
remains whether the courts would approve a rule directed at jurors precluding postverdict
communications with nonlitigants. Compare Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1078 with Note, supra
note 18, at 903-04. Jurors are, of course at liberty to refuse to discuss the case and there
appears to be no problem with advising them of this right. Id. at 900 & n.84.
2" See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126.
229 Id.
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:389
dresses of the jurors are kept secret.230 This procedure has been
justified by the federal appellate courts for the reason that the ju-
rors should be insulated from harassment and intimidation, one of
the major policy considerations in the area of impeachment of jury
verdicts."" It is apparent that in approving the concept of anony-
mous jurors,23 2 the courts have made it clear that the right to the
names and addresses of jurors is not absolute. This procedure has
an even greater effect on impeachment of jury verdicts than court
orders limiting postverdict contacts with jurors. Since the names
and addresses of jurors will never be divulged, it is virtually impos-
sible for the parties, the media, or anyone, for that matter, to com-
municate with the jurors. As a result, the revelation of potential
grounds for verdict impeachment is substantially reduced, if not
eliminated entirely.
F. Constitutional Implications of Tanner
Tanner addresses a number of constitutional considerations in
the area of jury verdict impeachment. 23 3 It is clear that courts con-
tinue to recognize the importance of the sixth amendment right to
a fair and impartial jury,2 34 and the importance of that right as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.23 5 How-
210 See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1021-26 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
910 (1988); United States v. Edmond, 730 F. Supp. 1144, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990) (ordering use
of anonymous jury). Anonymous juries have been increasingly used in the Second Circuit
and their use is now spreading to the other circuits. Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1021-22.
2"I See Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1024-25.
232 See id. at 1023. In Scarfo, Justice Weis stated:
The virtue of the jury system lies in the random summoning from the com-
munity of twelve "indifferent" persons--"not appointed till the hour of trial"--to
decide a dispute, and in their subsequent, unencumbered return to their normal
pursuits.. . . The lack of continuity in their service tends to insulate jurors from
recrimination for their decisions and to prevent the occasional mistake of one
panel from being perpetuated in future deliberations. Because the system contem-
plates that jurors will inconspicuously fade back into the community once their
tenure is completed, anonymity would seem entirely consistent with, rather than
anathema to, the jury concept. In short, we believe that the probable merits of the
anonymous jury procedure are worthy, not of a presumption of irregularity, but of
disinterested appraisal by the courts.
Id. (citation omitted).
2I Tanner, 483 U.S. at 107.
13, See id. at 127; Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988) (private com-
munication with juror is presumptively prejudicial), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
13 See Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832
(1988); Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 420, 541 A.2d 1001, 1006 (1988); Thompson, supra
note 9, at 1193; Note, Racial Slurs, supra note 157, at 1504; see also supra note 60 and
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ever, it does appear that the Tanner Court has limited that right.
The Court, in addition to concluding that the juror evidence was
inadmissible under Rule 606(b), held that the United States Con-
stitution did not require the trial court to hold an additional evi-
dentiary hearing to permit the defendant to adduce that evidence.
The Court found that the defendant's sixth amendment interest in
an unimpaired jury was adequately protected by other aspects of
the trial process, such as voir dire, observations made by the court,
court personnel, and counsel during the proceedings, the possibil-
ity of reports of misconduct by jurors before the verdict is ren-
dered, and the availability of nonjuror evidence. 236 The Tanner
holding will certainly affect future decisions with regard to the
constitutional requirements of holding a hearing, especially in
cases involving the alleged incapacity of a juror.
Perhaps even more important is the observation in Tanner
that: "[Although] post-verdict investigation into juror misconduct
would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts
reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior[,] [i]t is not
at all clear ... that the jury system could survive such efforts to
perfect it. '2 37 This statement, when viewed with the Tanner hold-
ing, indicates that the Court is inclined to further restrict the im-
peachment of jury verdicts. It may even suggest a willingness by
the Court to adopt a position that preservation of the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury will require additional restrictions on
postverdict contacts with jurors and the impeachment of jury
verdicts.
VI. THE Two OPPOSING VIEWS
Unfortunately, the two-hundred-year-long debate over the im-
peachment of jury verdicts has not reached a resolution. It has,
however, sharpened the issues and refined the respective positions.
The body of law governing the impeachment of jury verdicts is
driven by a number of important and conflicting policy considera-
tions, which have given rise to two disparate views. Proponents of
the first viewpoint, which most scholars have adopted, argue that
the interests of fairness and accuracy of result mandate the adop-
accompanying text.
213 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127; see also Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1081 (enough safeguards
present despite juror hearing disability).
237 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
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tion of a liberal approach with regard to inquiries into jury verdicts
and the impeachment of those verdicts. They focus on whether the
verdict in a particular case was rendered by a fair and impartial
jury, based solely on the evidence, a position that finds its roots in
the Constitution.
Proponents of the second view, which Congress and most
courts have adopted, advocate restriction of posttrial scrutiny of
jury verdicts. They focus primarily on protecting individual jurors
and the jury system as a whole. This position is based on a number
of policy considerations and is also derived from the Constitution.
One of the chief policy considerations underlying this view is the
concern that protection of citizens' liberty will be compromised
without secrecy of jury deliberations. Jurors will not feel free to
render unpopular verdicts or verdicts that could offend those in
power if there is a possibility that individual jurors may be ex-
amined publicly as to the positions that they have taken. As one
commentator expressed it, "[P]osttrial scrutiny sabotages sixth
and seventh amendment values to the extent that, when jurors are
chosen from the community and must one day return to it, the
public's very possession of information about their deliberations
may become tantamount to control over them."238 Proponents of
this view also maintain that impeachment of jury verdicts may
lead to harassment and threats against jurors, thwart free discus-
sion in the jury room, and erode public confidence in the judg-
ments of the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years we have seen a trend towards a more restric-
tive approach in the law governing impeachment of jury verdicts.
Congress took this tack in adopting rule 606(b), and thereafter the
courts expanded the scope of the rule and limited the application
of its exceptions. The courts have also developed procedural rules
making it more difficult to attack jury verdicts. The proliferation
of court rules and orders limiting postverdict contact with jurors
and the increased use of anonymous juries is perhaps even more
significant. These developments have created a strong movement
in this body of law, reflecting the courts' increased focus upon the
more universal concerns relating to the the preservation of the jury
system, rather than the fairness and impartiality of the jury in a
23 Note, supra note 18.
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particular case.
The possibility exists that the course of the law may shift.
However, this change will only come about if the courts and legis-
latures are convinced that individual jurors and the jury system as
a whole are adequately protected. Until that time we can expect
the law of impeachment of jury verdicts to become, if anything,
even more restrictive.

